Can there be knowledge that is independent of culture?
Is objectivity an illusion?
“All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from particular points of view”, wrote German sociologist Max Weber (Weber and Heydebrand). Knowledge, to him, could not be detached or separated from one’s perspective and culture. This essay shall examine this claim, beginning by laying out definitions of ‘culture’ and ‘knowledge’.
“Culture refers to the cumulative deposit of experience, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired by a group of people in the course of generations.” (Open Access Labs)
As for knowledge, according to Plato, in order for a claim to count as (propositional) knowledge, it must be a justified, true belief (Ichikawa and Steup). Needless to say, what people believe in, as well as their notions of “truth”, are often dependent on the values, attitudes and beliefs instilled in them. It follows from this fact that knowledge (which comprises a justification, a true statement, and belief in the proposition) is naturally dependent on culture. The question we are faced with, however, is not whether knowledge is dependent on culture, but whether there can be any knowledge at all that is wholly independent of culture. In other words, whether it is possible for individuals or groups to hold justified, true beliefs that do not bear any relation to their experiences, beliefs, values and (pre-existing) concepts of the universe.
Different areas of knowledge are each influenced to a different degree by one’s culture. For instance, the arts are generally perceived to be more dependent on culture as compared to the natural sciences, which are seen as more objective, and hence as more independent of culture. This sentiment was echoed by Louis Pasteur when he declared, “Science knows no country, because knowledge belongs to humanity, and is the torch which illuminates the world” (Heydorn and Jesudason). Thus, in order to explore the question of whether there can be knowledge that is independent of culture, this essay will examine knowledge claims within the realm of the natural sciences, and their relationship to culture. Specifically, the discussion will look at claims of both a qualitative and quantitative nature, and how they are impacted by culture.
The natural sciences involve making empirical observations in order to arrive at conclusions and make generalisations. The observations that one makes in the pursuit of investigating a scientific phenomenon are often dependent on culture, because culture affects how one sees reality. This point can be illustrated by considering the case of the Australian jewel beetle.
In Australia in the 1980s, a group of researchers discovered a widespread phenomenon of male jewel beetles trying to mate with beer bottles. At first, the researchers were flummoxed by this discovery — that is, until they realised that female Australian jewel beetles shared a striking resemblance with beer bottles, since they, like the beer bottles, were golden brown in colour and were covered with dimples (see figure 1 and 2) (Krulwich).
This phenomenon was cited as an evolutionary trap — the male beetles mistook the beer bottles for the females because for the longest time, they had spotted females using what cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman termed an “evolutionary hack.” To them, anything that was brown, dimpled and glossy was a female. This anecdote illustrates how natural selection has caused us to evolve not in a way that necessarily makes us see reality as it is, but rather, in a way that increases our odds of survival (Hoffman). Subsequently, empirical observations that we make for the purpose of gaining knowledge in the field of the natural sciences do not necessarily reflect reality, because it is quite unlikely that we see reality as it really is. Therefore, even the most innocuous of observations (such as that carrots are orange, for instance) are influenced by our beliefs and concepts of the universe, and are therefore dependent on culture.
This notion, however, only sheds light on the dependence of qualitative data on culture. It can be argued that quantitative data, unlike qualitative data, is independent of culture, and as a result knowledge in the natural sciences can be independent of culture. Take, for example, Sir Isaac Newton’s second law of motion, which states that the force (in newtons) is equal to the mass (in kilograms) multiplied by acceleration (in metres per second squared). Here, the concept of f = ma is not dependent on how we see reality. Even if we saw the world through a totally different lens; even if we were all colourblind, for example, f would still equal m times a (for it is a physical law). This claim is particularly appealing because it is simultaneously compatible with the idea that we do not (necessarily) see reality as it is, while at the same time it refutes the idea that all knowledge is dependent on culture.
The problem with claiming that quantitative data is not reliant on culture, however, lies in the units in which quantitative data is measured, which are often greatly dependent on culture. For example, in 9th century England, the carcuate was a unit used to measure areas. A single unit was measured as the land that eight oxen could till in a single annual season (Wikipedia, “Carucate”). The quinaria, similarly, was another (now obsolete) unit for measuring area — it was devised specifically to measure the cross-sectional area of pipes in Roman water distribution systems (Wikipedia, “Quinaria”). These examples of obsolete (and somewhat absurd) units of measurement illustrate how, even though physical laws may remain unaffected by culture; how physical quantities are measured, and therefore how quantitative data is gathered, is heavily dependent on culture (since different units of measure were used for the same measurement/parameter by different societies at different points in time; a difference that arose as a result of cultural differences). As a result, even knowledge claims within the natural sciences that are quantitative in nature are at least somewhat dependent on culture. However, with the advent of the International System of Units (or SI, for short) in recent decades, quantitative measurements are increasingly becoming less and less dependent on culture, and more universalised.
Works Cited
Heydorn, Wendy, and Susan Jesudason. Theory of Knowledge for the IB Diploma Course Guide. S.L., Cambridge University Press, 2020.
Hoffman, Donald. “Do We See Reality as It Is?” Youtube, TED, 12 June 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYp5XuGYqqY. Accessed 10 Nov. 2022.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins, and Matthias Steup. “The Analysis of Knowledge.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, 7 Mar. 2017, plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/. Accessed 10 Nov. 2022.
Krulwich, Robert. “The Love That Dared Not Speak Its Name, of a Beetle for a Beer Bottle.” NPR, 19 June 2013, www.npr.org/sections/krulwich/2013/06/19/193493225/the-love-that-dared-not-speak-its-name-of-a-beetle-for-a-beer-bottle. Accessed 10 Nov. 2022.
Open Access Labs. “Culture Definition.” People.tamu.edu, OAL, people.tamu.edu/~i-choudhury/culture.html. Accessed 10 Nov. 2022.
Weber, Max, and Wolf V Heydebrand. Sociological Writings. New York, Continuum, 1994.
Wikipedia. “Carucate.” Wikipedia, 2 Apr. 2022, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carucate. Accessed 10 Nov. 2022.
Wikipedia. “Quinaria.” Wikipedia, 21 May 2021, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quinaria. Accessed 10 Nov. 2022.
