Why the West is to blame for Ukraine
Was the war in Ukraine inevitable?
On the 18th March, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin over allegations of war crimes. Putin may very well be a war criminal — but this is hardly news. Putin has the blood of more than 8,000 people on his hands: that is the plain truth. But this “senseless war”, as it has been dubbed by the West (and the UN) isn’t that senseless after all. Tragic? Yes, and immeasurably so. But to call it senseless, and by extension to call Putin irrational — that is taking it too far.
On the surface, it seems a petty objection. If I don’t object to calling Putin a war criminal, or to hoping that he rots in the depths of hell, then why on Earth would I be so defensive about Putin’s rationality?
Consider the war from a different perspective, and one realises that all of this rhetoric about Putin being a deranged tyrant is a carefully crafted narrative by the West, to divert our attention away from how the West’s actions (and even lack thereof) enabled this war in the first place. If Western governments can get us to believe that Putin is irrational, the natural assumption one is led to is that the war in Ukraine was unforeseeable and, by extension, unavoidable.
I strongly object to this view. Calling war inevitable is too deterministic, essentially a ‘get out of jail free card’ — a tactic that allows states to distance themselves from any responsibility whatsoever.
Russia’s relationship to Ukraine far predates Putin. Russia has long been held a hostile attitude towards Ukraine — but it is nonetheless imperative to examine the war in terms of Putin’s motives, because ultimately Putin would not have waged war on Ukraine had it not benefitted him personally — irrespective of the relationship between the two states. According to political scientist Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “where politics are concerned, ideology, nationality and culture don’t matter all that much… politics, like all life, is about individuals, each motivated to do what is good for them, not what is good for others.”
To understand what drove Putin to wage a war in Ukraine, it is imperative to understand the war from Putin’s perspective. As Sun Tzu aptly wrote, “to defeat your Enemy, you must become your Enemy.” There are three principal reasons behind Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine: to curb Western expansionism, his expectation for a swift victory, and a desire to boost his popularity in Russia.
Let’s start with the point about Western expansionism. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the EU and NATO have continued to expand into Eastern Europe, and slowly but surely encroach on Russia’s sphere of influence. Since 2008, America and its allies have pushed to make Ukraine a part of NATO, in spite of Russia having made it abundantly clear that Ukrainian membership into NATO would be categorically unacceptable. As Mearsheimer argues, “America ignored Moscow’s red line, however, and pushed forward to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border”, continually disregarding clear signals from Moscow.
Apart from as a response to the West’s actions, the Ukraine war is also partially a result of the West’s inaction. What ultimately drove Putin to carry through with the invasion of Ukraine beyond the need to curb NATO expansion was his expectation of a swift victory. Here, it is important to emphasise that even if Putin had felt threatened by NATO expansion, if he had felt that Russia stood no chance in Ukraine he would undoubtedly have refrained from the war. It was only because Putin believed he had a good chance did he follow through with the invasion.
Putin’s expectation of a swift victory, though obviously wrong in hindsight, was perfectly rational given the facts of the situation. As Mark F. Cancian, Senior Advisor at the International Security Programme writes, “Putin’s decision was rational, though risky, like all judgments to go to war. He gambled and lost, but that did not make him irrational.” Historically, the USA and EU had not responded particularly strongly to Russian aggression, for example when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, although Russia was sanctioned, the sanctions were more of a “slap on the wrist” than anything. Putin, therefore, had good reason to believe that this time would be no different — and the West would let him get away with aggression once more. Moreover, Russia’s swift victory in Crimea probably led Putin to underestimate the strength of the Ukrainian military — which consisted of short-term conscripts, used obsolete equipment, and had an exceptionally weak navy. Russia, in contrast, had modernised its arms forces by allocating a greater proportion of the budget to military expenditure, increased the size of armed forces as well as their quality (through more rigorous training).
Looking beyond just security considerations, as any cynic would rightly point out — there was an element of self-interest in Putin’s actions. Putin’s approval ratings had been gradually declining for a few consecutive years and had nearly fallen to their lowest level ever. In order to improve his popularity in Russia by distracting the public and unifying them against a common enemy, Putin may have sought a quick military victory in Ukraine — a tried and tested strategy that was summed up by George Orwell when he declared, “war is peace.” Indeed, when Putin annexed Crimea in 2014, his approval rating skyrocketed from roughly 60% to 80%. Even though Russia has failed to secure a quick victory in Ukraine, the war has nonetheless proven effective in boosting Putin’s approval ratings by roughly 20%.
All of this being said, I must emphasise that my point is not that the West is culpable for the war in Ukraine — though one could certainly argue that, as Mearsheimer has. The only claim that I contest is that Putin is irrational.
Perhaps part of the reason behind our perception of Putin as an irrational actor is our deep-rooted conviction that Russia is solely to blame for the crisis in Ukraine, and our inability to see how our refusal to stand up to Russian aggression in the past has emboldened Putin to invade Ukraine. In a way, this is reminiscent of Hitler’s aggression prior to WW2, which was also partly as a result of the unwillingness of the Big Three to stand up to German aggression, which in turn increased Hitler’s confidence. One would think that we would have learned our lesson by now — why do we even study history, if we refuse to learn from it?
As I brood over the avoidable tragedy that was the Ukraine war, I am reminded of the lyrics of an old Bob Dylan song, Blowin’ In the Wind:
Yes n’ how many deaths will it take till he knows that too many people have died?
The answer my friend is blowin’ in the wind
The answer is blowin’ in the wind
Article originally published on the 29th March.
